



**Peace-Enforcement:
Mission, Strategy, and Doctrine**

**A Monograph
by**

**Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey B. Kohler
United States Air Force**



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This monograph examines a new military mission--peace-enforcement. It does so through a five part strategic process that links national interests and national security strategy to tactical operations. It asserts that US national security strategy is evolving as a result of the end of the Cold War and that a new strategy will lead to new military missions.

The monograph first describes a limited spectrum of military operations that comprise a peace-enforcement mission. Next, it reviews enduring US national interests then analyzes evolving national security strategy to determine if these elements of strategy support the need for a peace-enforcement mission. The monograph then examines national military strategy, operational level strategy and joint guidance, and finally, US tactical doctrine to determine if peace-enforcement is a mission the US military can execute today.

The monograph concludes that national interests and evolving national security strategy will emphasize promotion of democracy and stability in lieu of Cold War deterrence. The national military strategy partially supports this shift; support should increase as the Clinton administration clarifies its policy and solidifies the shift from containment. Lastly, the monograph finds there is sufficient operational and tactical level guidance to conduct the mission and recommends formal acceptance of the peace-enforcement mission into joint doctrine.

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ABSTRACT

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I: INTRODUCTION

Over the last few years, US military forces have been employed in what many see as non-traditional missions. These include counter-drug operations, relief for victims of natural disasters, foreign and domestic, and guaranteeing humanitarian aid in northern Iraq and Somalia. With the end of the Cold War, these so-called non-traditional missions will become even more prevalent. They are the result of changes in US national security strategy and the changing world security environment. One of these new missions will be peace-enforcement.

Richard Clarke, Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs, has called 1990-1991 a "watershed in history, a time when one era ended and another began."¹ During this period the Cold War ended, the Soviet state collapsed, and the US led a major coalition war against Iraq. The end of World War II was a similar watershed, when US national strategy took a radical new direction. Consequently, US military strategy and doctrine underwent monumental changes.

The 1988 version of the National Security Strategy of the United States emphatically confirmed that "the national strategy to achieve [a free Europe] has been containment, in the broadest sense of that term."² Indeed, containment, both the term and the strategic

concept, dominated US foreign policy for much of the Cold War. As the centerpiece of US policy, containment had far reaching impact on all elements of national power, to include political, economic, and especially, military.

US foreign policy prior to World War II was isolationist. Four years of war shattered that policy and left the US as the strongest economic power in the world, but unsure of its role in the post-war security environment. Less than six months after the end of World War II, George Kennan, a US State Department official in Moscow, provided a reassessment of US policy towards the Soviet Union. His "long telegram" set in motion a process that was to change and influence American foreign policy for the next forty-five years.³

Kennan's strategic concept was reiterated in his famous "Mr. X" article, coining the term "containment." Yet, US foreign policy was neither consistent nor unified. There were major battles over missions and for slices of the budget among government agencies. The military was at the forefront of this turmoil. The National Security Act of 1947 and its various amendments, and the so-called "revolt of the admirals," brought the debate into the public spotlight.⁴

President Truman modified Kennan's original concept by extending aid to Greece and Turkey when

those countries were threatened by communist aggression. Yet, at the time of the Berlin conflict, the US had only one Army division in Europe and no overseas bases for its new Air Force to use.⁵ There appeared to be a major gap between concept and capability. As a result, President Truman directed a review of US policy, primarily to examine the country's military capability to support a strategy of containment.⁶

A committee, primarily of State and Defense Department officials, drafted what was to be called NSC-68. The document warned that US armed forces would have to rely on atomic weapons--because of wholesale demobilization--to halt further communist military action. By 1950 the US military comprised only 10 weak Army divisions, 2 Marine Corps divisions, a mixture of naval forces, and a newly formed Air Force.⁷ As a result, NSC-68 recognized a major fault in the US military's ability to react to what would become "limited wars."

Containment, nevertheless, remained the focus of US policy. It was based on strategic nuclear deterrence and, as NATO grew, increased emphasis on forward and collective defense. During the 1950s, strategic air power became the preeminent military force and "centerpiece for American defense."⁸ Decisions to rely on nuclear weapons at the expense of

more flexible conventional forces caused two Army Chiefs of Staff, Generals Ridgway and Taylor, to quarrel with the administration and eventually resign.⁹

Responding to fiscal policy and the communist threat, military strategy, doctrine and force structure also underwent drastic changes. Eisenhower's "New Look" (NSC-162/2) restructured the military with nuclear submarines, ICBMs, and nuclear artillery. Nuclear strategies had new names such as massive retaliation and assured destruction.¹⁰ Tactical doctrine attempted to balance counter-insurgency and nuclear weapons; flexible response evolved into active defense. Towards the end of the 1970s and into the 1980s, doctrine evolved to exploit new technologies and environments. The result was AirLand Battle. However, all of this was dominated and guided by the threat of communism and the national policy of containment.

Yet, by 1988, cracks began to appear within the communist bloc. In describing a "New World Order," President Bush predicted that the US "will face new challenges that take us beyond containment to a key role in helping forge a democratic peace."¹¹ The military must face these new challenges as it reexamines its strategy and doctrine. As US national security and military strategies evolve and adapt to the new world environment, new missions will evolve

from this reexamination just as they did during the early years of the Cold War.

II: METHODOLOGY

One such new mission will be peace-enforcement. This study will first broadly define that mission and then briefly describe what it may or may not constitute. It will then evaluate the peace-enforcement mission within a five-part strategic process proposed by Drew and Snow in Making Strategy.¹² This process offers an unique framework that links the formulation of national strategy with tactical operations and specific missions.

The first step in the process is the determination of national interests and objectives. The second is the development of a national grand strategy, or national security strategy. Next is the formulation of a national military strategy that links the military element of national power to national strategy. The fourth step in the process is the development of an "operational strategy" normally applied by regional warfighting commanders in peacetime. The final step is the design of "battlefield strategy," or tactics, which must successfully execute operational and national military strategy.¹³ To determine if peace-enforcement is a potential mission for the US military, it will be examined as it relates to each step in the process.

Peace-enforcement, as a military mission, would be conducted at the operational and tactical end of the process. However, operational strategy, as well as tactical doctrine, should be linked to national and military strategy developed at the highest levels. By examining each of the levels of strategy (herein referred to levels of war), this study will determine if national leaders could use this mission to protect or further US interests and consequently, if military commanders have the doctrinal tools to execute peace-enforcement missions.

III: PEACE-ENFORCEMENT MISSIONS

A draft joint publication, Joint Pub 3-07.3, has defined peace-enforcement as: "Military operations in support of diplomatic efforts to restore peace between belligerents who may not be consenting to intervention, and may be engaged in combat activities."¹⁴

(Definitions of commonly used terms and their relationships may be found in Appendices A and B.) In contrast, a peacekeeping mission, under US doctrine currently defined by Joint Pub 3-07.3, requires the consent of the belligerent forces involved and assumes that hostilities have ceased, or that at least a truce is in effect, before peacekeeping forces are deployed. International organizations, such as the International Peace Academy, take a broader view of peacekeeping and

include "containment, moderation and termination of hostilities between or within states . . . to restore and maintain peace."¹⁵ This definition of peacekeeping includes elements of combat operations such as operations to restore order and prevention of hostilities by force. However, US joint doctrine clearly restricts its definition of peacekeeping, excluding those activities from peacekeeping doctrine.¹⁶

Upon closer examination, the US joint definition of peace-enforcement, along with the associated definition of peacekeeping, tends to focus more on what the mission is not than what it is. Therefore, it is necessary to further define what this mission may normally encompass. The key concept within the joint definition is to restore a condition of order, or peace, between hostile forces who do not necessarily desire intervention. In other words, they will likely resist outside forces. Resistance could occur at significantly different levels, resulting in the requirement for different military responses.

The most violent end of the peace-enforcement mission would be direct military intervention. In a situation such as that in the former Yugoslavia, decisive force would be used to end hostilities and compel the belligerents to conclude a truce or possibly negotiate an end to their differences. Thus, if

conducting a peace-enforcement--vice peacekeeping--mission, US forces could be committed without the consent of all belligerents and should expect various degrees of resistance and combat.

At the other end of peace-enforcement operations is humanitarian conflict.¹⁷ US forces that conducted Operation Sea Angel, the disaster relief of Bangladesh, did not encounter resistance nor were they armed during the operation. Conversely, Operations Provide Comfort (Kurdish relief) and Restore Hope (Somalian relief) involved armed conflict. US forces provided humanitarian relief, but often had to use the threat, or actual employment, of substantial military power to accomplish the mission. A key element in each operation was the use of military force to restore and maintain security and order.

Other military peace-enforcement operations lie between these two extremes. During an attempted coup against the Philippine government in December 1989, a few US fighter aircraft, in a show of force over Manila, were sufficient to halt the coup and stabilize the Aquino government. The use of US naval forces to escort Kuwaiti oil tankers during the latter stages of the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988) may also be an example. Although military presence did not stop the war, it prevented its spread into other Persian Gulf countries and supported diplomatic discussions.¹⁸ Stephen Rosen,

a US national security policy expert, has labeled this type of operation a "firebreak mission."¹⁹

These previous examples presuppose that hostilities exist in the particular area. President Bush, along with some UN officials, has urged the international community to consider "preventive peacekeeping" as a means to intercede in an area before hostilities actually erupt.²⁰ Diplomatic negotiations often are a slow, arduous process which may not prevent hostilities from commencing during the discussions. In this case, a peace-enforcement mission would set the stage for diplomatic efforts to continue (peacemaking).²¹ Many Third World countries continue to experience interstate border disputes, while others face intrastate socio-economic based conflict. A peace-enforcement mission could be employed in either case to deter violence between potential belligerents and allow a peaceful resolution of the problem.

A mission labeled peace-enforcement would therefore fall within a broad spectrum. This spectrum itself lies within the level of conflict often termed operations short of war (also, other than war). At this level, military forces perform a multitude of missions including counter-narcotics, peacekeeping, nation building, and if required, short, intense use of direct force such as an airstrike.²² Appendix B

provides a frame of reference for the operational continuum and the relationship of various terms.²³

IV: US NATIONAL INTERESTS

More than any other factor, national interests guide and motivate the actions of a nation-state.²⁴ Together, national objectives and interests represent the "what" and "why" of a nation's actions.²⁵ Yet, promotion of national interests does not automatically equate to the use of military force. The US has suffered two economic recessions in the last decade, but has not attacked other nations with military forces over restrictive trade practices. The importance of each national interest has waxed and waned depending on the world and domestic situation. This was particularly true during the era of the Cold War when the bipolar conflict between the US and the Soviet Union dominated nearly every strategic issue.

The first step in the strategic process is to examine US national goals and interests. The August 1991 National Security Strategy of the United States lists four basic interests and associated objectives. These four interests have endured throughout most of American history and have dominated the era since World War II. They are:²⁶

The survival of the United States as a free and independent nation, with its fundamental values intact and its institutions and people secure.

A healthy and growing U.S. economy to ensure opportunity for individual prosperity and resources for national endeavors at home and abroad.

Healthy, cooperative and politically vigorous relations with allies and friendly nations.

A stable and secure world, where political and economic freedom, human rights and democratic institutions flourish.

Donald Nuechterlein, a noted expert on US foreign policy, developed a model to differentiate between interests where the US might use military force to compel an adversary and those where other elements of power should prevail.²⁷ In this model, a major interest is one where the country is adversely impacted, economically or socially, but the problem can be addressed by other than military force. Conversely, a vital interest is one that may threaten the basic political, economic, or social fabric of the country and the country's leaders are willing to use military force to protect this interest. Since peace-enforcement involves armed conflict, it must be seen to support a vital interest.

The first national interest is survival of the country. The corresponding objectives include the requirement to "discourage military adventurism" and defeat an attack that threatens the security of an ally.²⁸ A mission of peace-enforcement would not

support this interest and its objectives. Arms control is emphasized to deter military adventurism. The latter objective, defeating an attack, would exceed the scope of a peace-enforcement mission and is closer to the UN's actions against Iraq.'

There are potential circumstances, albeit remote, in which US forces could be employed to enforce peace in a country or region vital to US economic well-being, the second national interest. One of the objectives states that the nation must "ensure access to foreign markets, energy, mineral resources, the oceans and space."²⁹ Enforcement of the UN no-fly zone in southern Iraq could possibly be viewed as a peace-enforcement mission in that it secures oil resources. Although both are considered vital interests, neither of these two national interests, survival nor economic prosperity, fully support the need for a peace-enforcement mission.

National military doctrine states that the US will use force to protect the stability and viability of friendly governments which are threatened either internally or externally.³⁰ In fact, the US has consistently demonstrated a willingness to support allies with military forces, which is the third national interest. The recent Gulf War is an example. However, this level of support is atypical and goes beyond the limited nature of a peace-enforcement

mission. The objectives usually associated with this interest focus on economic assistance and diplomatic actions. Military actions would normally consist of nation building, training teams, and other operations not normally part of the peace-enforcement mission.

The three national interests discussed thus far only remotely support a unique mission of peace-enforcement. Given the current world and domestic situation, the last US interest--the desire for a secure, stable world where democratic governments flourish--more clearly supports this mission.

The Presidential Commission on Integrated Long-term Strategy concluded that US national interests in the Third World will most likely increase in the future. These interests include "defending and advancing the cause of democracy, freedom, and human rights."³¹ The objectives of the fourth national security interest above, state that the US needs to:

- maintain stable regional military balances;
- promote the growth of free, democratic political institutions;
- promote diplomatic solutions to regional disputes;
- aid in combatting threats to democratic institutions from aggression.³²

This fourth interest, including its stated objectives, most clearly supports a peace-enforcement mission. If peacemaking fails, military forces could provide a

rapid termination of hostilities and prevent an increase in the intensity of the conflict.

Despite continued uncertainty in the world security environment, US foreign policy will continue to be motivated by these enduring national interests. Given the instability in the current environment, the fourth interest, namely, a secure and stable world, may become the most important in the future.³³ The other interests and objectives become much easier to attain if the fourth is achieved. A peace-enforcement mission would be a useful tool to ensure stability and attain this national interest.

The next step in the strategic process will examine the formulation of a "Grand Strategy" to realize these interests and goals. Grand strategy is often referred to as foreign policy and, in the US, is formalized in a National Security Strategy (NSS) document published by the President. For the purposes of this paper, the terms will be synonymous.

V: NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

If objectives are what the US wants to accomplish and interests are the why, then national grand strategy is the how. Grand strategy is the process which coordinates and applies elements of national power to attain national objectives and interests.³⁴ As Mr. Clarke suggests, the country is at a unique watershed

in the formulation of grand strategy. Containment has ceased to be the underpinning strategic policy of the nation. Thus, for America to have a coherent strategy it must find a new policy to replace that of containment.³⁵

The relative priority the nation places on its interests is influenced by many factors. Although it is the nation's foreign policy, it is often reacting more to domestic politics than international events.³⁶ The country may not have enough power to attain every interest to the same degree, necessitating prioritization of national interests during the formulation of a strategy. Likewise, elements of power are not constant and are affected by budgetary decisions, the economy, and selection of civilian and military leaders.

The prime actors in this stage are principally elected public officials in the US. Although some senior military leaders may be allowed to comment on national security policy through the National Security Council process, the two major actors are the President and Congress. The President is required to periodically send Congress a national security strategy addressing how the elements of national power will be used to secure the country's interests. The president attempts to link the basic values of the American

people to a strategy that balances the country's power with a clear purpose.³⁷

Future US national strategy will require a bipartisan consensus which clearly establishes the near term course of US foreign policy.³⁸ This new course in national strategy began to take shape in 1990.

The 1988 National Security Strategy document centered US foreign policy specifically around containment.³⁹ While US-Soviet relations had entered a new era of glasnost and perestroika, the Soviet bloc was still intact and remained the focus of US foreign policy. Yet by 1990, the NSS stated that "the very success of containment has created new conditions and new opportunities" for America's foreign policy.⁴⁰ The door was opening to steer basic national security strategy away from containment towards a significantly different philosophy. This new direction received momentum on 2 August 1990, during a pivotal Presidential address in Aspen, Colorado.

Pronouncing a new security environment, President Bush declared that an era of democratic freedom had begun, brought about by the end of ideological divisions within Europe. To accommodate this new era, the country needed a new defense strategy to ensure peace in a new era: "a policy of peacetime engagement every bit as constant and committed to the defense of our interests and ideals in today's world as" during

the Cold War and containment.⁴¹ Although originally labeled peacetime engagement, State Department officials have consolidated this emerging strategy under the term "collective engagement."⁴²

Collective engagement is built upon the reality that the US is the sole superpower in the world since the decline and dissolution of the Soviet Union. It assumes that the American people recognize this and support the nation's world leadership position. The policy is woven around five complementary concepts: "the promotion and consolidation of democratic value, promoting market principles and strengthening U.S. competitiveness, promoting peace, protecting against transnational threats, and meeting urgent humanitarian needs."⁴³ To accomplish these objectives, the US must be actively engaged in international events. The nation's power must be applied collectively with that of other nations holding similar interests and values, and focused on common problems.

As the name itself implies, collective engagement seeks to share costs, hazards and rewards with other nations. Although the US may be forced to act independently, collective engagement strives to join the elements of its power with those of other nations. When nations act in concert, the relative value of each element of strategy is increased. Major problems, such as economic and political reform in Eastern Europe or

nuclear weapons proliferation, will require large coalitions of states to provide lasting solutions.⁴⁴

Before the peace-enforcement mission can be assessed against national strategy, the concept of collective engagement, or at least its principles, must be accepted as the most probable future strategy. In fact, there appears to be a strong bipartisan consensus, including the incoming Clinton administration, that endorses the basic principles of collective engagement.⁴⁵ Thus far, policy statements from the new administration are similar to those that defined Bush's collective engagement; they reaffirm support for economic resurgence, continuation of a qualitatively strong, albeit smaller military, and a desire to continue aid to developing nations, and the spread of democratic institutions and principles.⁴⁶ Therefore, this study will accept collective engagement as the underpinning strategic policy that replaces containment at least through the turn of the century.

Based on a policy of collective engagement, the National Security Strategy lays out the fundamental concepts that link each element of power to the national interests and objectives. The political and economic elements of power reinforce the basic tenets of collective engagement. Military power is redirected away from the Soviet threat and towards multipolar, regionally based threats.⁴⁷

The full force of the military element of national power should be used as a last resort and only after economic and diplomatic power have been unsuccessfully applied. However, forces could be employed to accomplish each of the five concepts of collective engagement and complement diplomatic and economic actions. Specifically, a peace-enforcement mission would be useful in promotion of democratic values and peace, protection against "transnational" threats, and urgent humanitarian relief.

But these types of actions are not the traditional, high-intensity, global war scenarios that the majority of US forces were trained and equipped for in the 1970s and 1980s. Some experts contend that US forces may not currently be prepared for Third World, low intensity conflicts.⁴⁸ Peace-enforcement operations will have significant political and military challenges. Furthermore, the political end state may not be so clearly defined as military commanders would like.

The concepts of collective engagement, as they relate to the military and a peace-enforcement mission, are manifested in the four "foundations" of the national military strategy. They are strategic nuclear deterrence, forward presence, response to regional crises, and the ability to reconstitute additional forces (military and industrial) if a global threat

resurfaces.⁴⁹ The NSS provides a simplistic overview of each. The ideas are developed further through the national military strategy.

VI: NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY

Military strategy is a coordinated effort to develop, deploy, and if required, employ appropriate military forces to secure national interests.⁵⁰ The two key elements are development and deployment because they often spell success or failure in actual employment. In two notable instances, the French in May 1940 and the Americans in June 1950, soldiers faced defeat because their respective nations had developed and deployed forces unsuited for the initial stages of the war they fought.

A significant change in the direction of national strategy will have a profound impact on military strategy. The ongoing Congressional debate on the size, structure, and missions of future US military forces reflects this current dilemma. In linking national and military strategy, the National Military Strategy of the United States establishes broad guidelines for the development, deployment, and employment of US military forces. Based primarily on former President Bush's 2 August 1990 speech, the new military strategy turns away from forward based, global war scenarios requiring a large, standing military

force. Instead, the focus is on regional conflicts with only enough forces deployed out of the country to deter aggression and prevent regional wars.⁵¹

Two "pillars" of US military strategy, strategic deterrence and reconstitution, are focused on the vestiges of the Soviet Union.⁵² Military vigilance is required to deter the threat of nuclear attack from remnants of the Soviet Union. Continued strategic deterrence is also focused on proliferation of ballistic missile technology to unstable Third World countries. Reconstitution is required to provide a global war-fighting capability to counter the emergence of possible global threats such as resurgent Soviet communism or a fundamentalist religious movement. Neither one of these adequately supports a potential peace-enforcement mission; however, the other two "pillars" do.

Forward presence and crisis response are the other two key pillars of collective engagement.⁵³ Forward presence means a reduced level of troops stationed or deployed overseas, particularly in Europe, as compared to the previous strategy of forward defense. Nevertheless, it demonstrates US commitment to the collective security of friends and allies, and seeks to maintain stability in critical regions by deterring would-be aggressors with US military power.

Should forward presence fail to deter aggression, then the US military must demonstrate a crisis response capability which "might range from a single discriminate strike to the employment of overwhelming force to defeat a regional aggressor."⁵⁴ This broad guidance encompasses nearly the entire range of peace-enforcement missions discussed earlier. In addition, DOD policy statements and key joint publications reinforce this.⁵⁵

The National Military Strategy conspicuously avoids a discussion of the national security strategy; instead, the document lists only selected national interests and objectives. Therefore, additional guidance is required to amplify the military strategy before it can be expressed in an operational strategy. During testimony before the House Armed Services Committee in February 1991, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney called for "innovative new strategies that support representative government, integrate security assistance, and promote economic development," which would in turn bring stability to the Third World and deter conflicts.⁵⁶ The strategy he was referring to is collective engagement.

One can infer from this and other statements that collective engagement primarily involves military actions short of a major regional war. The Assistant Secretary of Defense, Special Operations/Low Intensity

Conflict (ASD [SO/LIC]), asserts that the US military must be prepared to execute operations short of war including "support for [diplomatic initiatives], pre-crisis activities, force projection and crisis response, [and] post-crisis activities."⁵⁷ This could range from humanitarian operations to full-scale contingency operations, the very range that encompasses peace-enforcement. The goal is to defuse crises and promote stability.

This emphasis on operations short of war is now possible because of the shift from a bipolar to a multipolar world. No longer focused on countering Soviet advances, national leaders can be more selective in employment of US military forces. These forces can be utilized to promote democracy and enforce human rights.⁵⁸ In other words, selectivity offers freedom of action, or the ability to employ US forces in potentially new ways to accomplish national security goals. The next step in the strategic process, operational strategy, deals with the application of forces towards specific missions.

VII: OPERATIONAL STRATEGY

Operational strategy focuses on the employment of military forces within guidelines set forth by the national military strategy.⁵⁹ In turn, operational commanders develop and, if required, execute campaign

plans within these guidelines. Their campaign plans must establish a course of action that achieves national strategic objectives (ends) through a sequence of operations (ways) by applying all theater resources available to the commander (means).⁶⁰ This "vital link" between national strategic objectives and actual tactical actions is operational art.⁶¹

The scope of this study does not allow a thorough examination of detailed theater campaign plans that could be utilized to conduct a peace-enforcement mission. However, guidance and direction for this mission does flow from the national military strategy to operational commanders through Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) and Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) directives and joint doctrine. This guidance is often a limiting factor on the conduct of operational art because it restricts ways and means through available resources and courses of action that may be executed.

The Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) is the method by which the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), provides strategic guidance to operational commanders and links military strategy with available resources and national security objectives.⁶² The Defense Planning Guidance document is the SECDEF's overall plan that provides strategic policy and fiscally constrained planning guidance to the CJCS and lower echelon operational commanders. Key elements of

this document, along with those of the Contingency Planning Guidance document, are provided to operational commanders through the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP).

The current JSCP does not direct operational commanders to prepare for a "peace-enforcement mission" by name. However, it does direct them to prepare for contingencies which would require exactly that.

National military objectives listed in the JSCP require forces and actions to: "ensure global access and influence; . . . deter or defeat aggression, singly, or in concert with allies; . . . [and] promote regional stability and cooperation."⁶³ These objectives

specifically include such tasks as protection of commerce, improving the spread of democracy, promotion of regional stability through forward presence, and deterring any military threat to allies or any "country whose sovereignty is vital to" US interests.⁶⁴

Although actions to accomplish these objectives cover the entire operational continuum, peace-enforcement missions could achieve each of these tasks within a more narrow spectrum of conflict.

Additionally, commanders are advised that it is "increasingly difficult to predict the circumstances" that would require the employment of US military forces, especially in "less traditional operations."⁶⁵ The thrust of this new guidance (1992) is that

operational commanders must thoroughly understand the changing security environment, provide advice on the application of all elements of US power to attain national objectives, and anticipate the proper use of military force within the region, including "non-traditional" missions.

The strategic direction provided by JSPS documents is also reinforced by joint publications. Basic National Defense Doctrine (Joint Pub 0-1) establishes several potential strategic objectives for US military forces that could be accomplished by means of a peace-enforcement mission.⁶⁶ By attaining national interests, military power positively influences and reinforces the nation's political power. This can be accomplished by using military force to alter actions and policies of hostile governments that oppose US interests. Military force can reinforce diplomatic efforts to sway a government or can conduct direct action to compel compliance. Operation Just Cause is an example of this type of peace-enforcement mission. A more positive approach would be to employ forces to reinforce friendly governments threatened by internal or external aggression, control lawlessness in a country, or provide humanitarian assistance. The operation in Somalia is a case in point.

More specific guidance is provided in the Joint Pub 3-0 series that provides broad guidance for joint

operations and concentrates on a prominent component of national and military strategy, namely, crisis response. According to Joint Pub 3-0, the military's contribution to crisis response could run the spectrum of possibilities from humanitarian assistance to combat operations.⁶⁷ These contingency operations "provide a rapid and tailored response to sudden hostilities in foreign countries," designed to "deter further escalation and aggression" and provide stability within the country and the region as a whole.⁶⁸

The responsibility for planning or anticipating such operations within a theater is the responsibility of the operational commander. His primary goal in operations short of war is to employ his assets to maintain and, if required, restore stability.⁶⁹ Joint doctrine cautions the commander to continually monitor theater threats to deter aggression and prevent war. A peace-enforcement mission would provide a rapid, timely response to a crisis, which in turn could stabilize the situation with relatively few resources.

Contingency operations to modify the actions of a belligerent country specifically include such missions as shows of force, strikes and raids, operations to restore order and intervention operations.⁷⁰ While combat operations are taking place, military forces may also restore civil functions, provide humanitarian relief, and assist in restoring diplomatic negotia-

tions.⁷¹ This is essentially the description of a peace-enforcement mission: military forces intervening and restoring order to establish conditions that allow diplomatic negotiation to end hostilities.

A peace-enforcement mission's end state is diplomatic negotiation and restoration of stable civil functions. Thus, the operational commander must establish effective civil-military relations which include governmental and non-governmental agencies. During contingency operations, civil affairs will play an important role in areas ranging from humanitarian assistance to public information.⁷² Expertise in interagency support and coordination, as well as liaison with indigenous groups, would enhance a peace-enforcement mission. Since civil affairs activities often have far reaching political ramifications, they may be addressed by specific National Command Authority (NCA) guidance.⁷³ This guidance may be one of the key factors establishing constraints on the nature and scope of a contingency operation. In turn, NCA directives will often establish political and military end states critical to conflict termination and post-conflict activities, both of which are essential elements of peace-enforcement.

Any general guidance provided to operational commanders must eventually be expressed as specific missions for military units. According to Drew and

Snow, this lowest level of strategy is tactics. In essence tactics employ, either directly or indirectly, military forces to attain operational objectives and in turn, strategic objectives.

VIII: TACTICS

Tactics for US military forces are codified in countless manuals and regulations published by the individual services and the joint staff. Each service has one document that serves as the basic source for other tactical manuals. This study will concentrate on these key documents to determine if combat units have the requisite capacity to conduct a peace-enforcement mission. At the tactical unit level, the mission envisioned by this study would include deployment to a region, forced entry into a country, securing a base of operations, offensive actions to separate hostile forces, maintenance of stability and order to allow diplomatic negotiations and other post-conflict activities, and finally, withdrawal of US forces.

The key publication within the US Army is Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations. It describes how the Army should "think about the conduct of campaigns, major operations, battles, engagements and operations other than war." FM 100-5 goes on to say that it is "the authoritative foundation for subordinate doctrine,

force design [and] acquisition, and individual and unit training."⁷⁴

Because US military strategy has shifted towards forward presence and away from large forward deployed forces, the new FM 100-5 redirects the Army towards force projection and specifies the essential tasks to prepare for this role. These tasks include predeployment preparation and mobilization, deployment, "entry, . . . decisive operations, . . . restoration" of order, and redeployment and demobilization.⁷⁵ This involves every aspect of a peace-enforcement mission previously described. Specifically, "decisive operations" require commanders at all levels to "assess the impact of current operations on consolidation, post-conflict activity and long term solutions to the original cause of the crisis."⁷⁶ "Restoration" focuses on post-conflict activities including reestablishment of order and host nation control, assisted by elements of US political, economic, and informational power.⁷⁷ The force projection concept is reinforced through discussion of fundamentals of offense, defense, logistics, and other related aspects of Army operations. This new orientation of Army doctrine will eventually find its way into supporting doctrinal manuals.

Air Force Manual (AFM) 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force, provides

guidance to tactical units, as well as operational planners, on the application of air power within the national military strategy. Elements of a peace-enforcement mission may be found within four essential roles: "aerospace control, force application, force enhancement, and force support."⁷⁸ Aerospace control and force application can isolate a crisis area by maintaining air superiority and by attacking surface forces. Force enhancement and support involve other aspects of peace-enforcement from force deployment to reconnaissance of the crisis area.

AFM 1-1 contends that these roles can be part of a joint operation or conducted independently by airpower forces.⁷⁹ This allows a military response to be tailored to the situation by supporting a large, decisive force designed to intercede in a crisis, or by conducting a small scale airstrike against a country threatening the US interests or allies. In particular, airstrikes have been enhanced by high technology, precision guided weapons and stealth aircraft, increasing the probability of target destruction while minimizing collateral damage and adverse political consequences from US casualties. AFM 1-1 also contends that this flexibility allows operational commanders to employ a variety of options with various degrees of violence. This may diffuse a crisis and allow

diplomats to take over, a critical element of any peace-enforcement mission.

The US Navy and Marine Corps have embarked on a radically new course in ...From the Sea, a doctrinal white paper published under the auspices of the Secretary of the Navy and both service chiefs. Its purpose is to structure the "vision" for both services into the 21st Century. Although joint warfare is a key component, emphasis is squarely on naval expeditionary forces.

The document stresses that Navy and Marine expeditionary forces must be able to respond to crises rapidly, then build and sustain operations from the sea. All of which provides "unobtrusive forward presence which may be intensified or withdrawn as required."⁸⁰ The document attempts to re-focus the Navy on littoral operations in lieu of a blue water strategy. Emphasis is also placed on "tailored" forces that "anticipate and support national needs."⁸¹ Although short on specifics, the new document promises to "concentrate on littoral warfare," supporting the regional orientation of the evolving security environment.⁸² Forward presence and crisis response play a large part in the new doctrine, indicating that it is in step with national security and national military strategy. Some retraining and major force restructuring may be required to completely support the

concept. Yet, the apparent successful start of Operation Restore Hope in Somalia demonstrates the flexibility of expeditionary forces as well as their present capacity to conduct peace-enforcement missions.

Joint Pub 3-07.3 establishes tactics, techniques and procedures for peacekeeping operations. Although peace-enforcement anticipates a higher intensity of combat activities, many aspects of a peacekeeping operation have direct correlation to a peace-enforcement operation, particularly in the areas of force selection, training and conduct of operations. Unique forces are not required; instead, forces could be combat and support units from any service.⁸³ Many of the planning factors and employment guidelines in peacekeeping are just as applicable to peace-enforcement. For example, the need for standard operating procedures, detailed rules of engagement, and contingency planning holds true for both missions. According to then Lt. General Shalikashvili,⁸⁴ at the time US commander of Operation Provide Comfort, and Major General McKenzie,⁸⁵ previously the commander of UN peacekeeping forces in Yugoslavia, thoroughly trained basic combat units were crucial to their operations.

Of particular interest is the publication's discussion of force training. Joint Pub 3-07.3 stresses leadership at all levels because of the unique

requirement of peacekeepers to balance diplomacy with the potential of renewed conflict. Peacekeeping requires an "adjustment of attitude" more oriented towards "peaceable intervention" than direct enforcement.⁸⁶ Emphasis shifts from destruction of the enemy to basic military skills usually associated with combat units such as command and control of forces, intelligence, explosive ordnance disposal, and patrolling. Once the peacekeeping operation has concluded, a limited training program will be required to re-orient forces towards their primary combat mission.

US military forces already conduct successful peacekeeping operations. While many aspects of a peace-enforcement mission are similar to those of a peacekeeping operation, the combat nature of the former is more intense. Thus, peace-enforcement requires little if any special training and is more closely associated with primary combat missions. Units operating under typical service doctrine should be able to accomplish any peace-enforcement mission.

IX: ANALYSIS

A cursory review of the strategic process indicates that peace-enforcement--the concept of intervening to deter or halt aggression, restoring order, and setting the stage for negotiations--is

compatible with each step in the strategic process. National interests seek stability, protection of allies, and promotion of democratic institutions. The national security strategy seeks to keep the US engaged through the use of all elements of power to accomplish these interests and objectives. Two critical components of the national military strategy, forward presence and crisis response, indicate that US military forces must be prepared to support the national strategy with force. Specific operational guidance lays the foundation for the employment of forces in a peace-enforcement role and links force employment with national objectives. Finally, key service and joint doctrines formulate the basic tactical tools required to conduct the mission. But on closer examination, some critical pieces are missing.

Where the process begins to break down is in the articulation of a national grand strategy. Throughout the Cold War, the guiding principles that made up containment were generally understood by US government officials, allies, and most adversaries. The same can not be said of post-Cold War US strategy. The purpose of the President's national security report to Congress is to establish a strategic vision that could be debated and acted upon by Congress, and made available to foreign governments.⁸⁷ The interests and objectives expressed in the NSS guide the country's behavior

towards aspirations of a new world order.⁸⁸ Despite official statements to the contrary, the lack of serious discussion of collective engagement in scholarly publications indicates that it is either misunderstood or not widely accepted as a replacement for containment.⁸⁹

The 1991 National Security Strategy of the United States does not address when US power will be expended to reach objectives in a resource-constrained strategy. If the US acts in every instance of human rights violations or supports every group seeking self-determination, its efforts will be diluted and result in limited gains. The mission of peace-enforcement is most clearly associated with national interests and objectives that seek a secure and stable world. Yet, there have not been any public pronouncements that emphatically label this as a vital interest. Because of the significance of this national interest in the future security environment, this dilemma must be resolved.

Ambiguity within the national security strategy creates similar confusion in the military strategy. A 1990 draft version of the National Military Strategy document used the term "peacetime engagement," which was replaced in the final document with "forward presence."⁹⁰ The debate over whether to include any reference or discussion of a term inherent to the

nation's foreign policy indicates uncertainty (or disagreement) at the highest levels on the direction of national and military strategies. Nowhere in the January 1992 NMS document can one find a clear concept of what the nation's foreign policy seeks to attain.

Military strategic objectives, the "ends," are not included in the NMS; instead, they can be found only in the JSCP. The JSCP lists the following national military objectives:

DETER OR DEFEAT AGGRESSION, SINGLY, OR IN CONCERT
WITH ALLIES . . . ENSURE GLOBAL ACCESS AND
INFLUENCE . . . PROMOTE REGIONAL STABILITY AND
COOPERATION . . . STEM THE FLOW OF ILLEGAL DRUGS
. . . [and] COMBAT TERRORISM⁹¹

These objectives are an integral part of the national military strategy and should be included in that document. Thus, a clear link would be established between the national security strategy and specific national military objectives.

Embracing collective engagement in the national military strategy would further eliminate any apparent ambiguity. Definitive guidance in the NSS and NMS would enable operational commanders to focus all of their resources on national objectives. This not only includes peace-enforcement, but more importantly, preventive diplomacy and peacemaking. The goal is to deter a crisis, not merely react to conflict.

This does not imply that collective engagement has been ignored within the DOD. In his Annual Report to the President and the Congress, the Secretary of Defense discusses the notion of peacetime engagement as a strategy particularly important to LIC. A relatively significant amount of information has come from the ASD (SO/LIC), including a major conference on peacetime engagement hosted by that office in August of 1991.⁹² Although the discussion of peacetime engagement has been significant, it is routinely associated with LIC. Once again, ambiguity is created. Is peacetime engagement a national security strategy or is it merely a strategy within LIC? Is it a subset of collective engagement? Which department, State or Defense, is the lead agency to establish foreign policy?

Despite weaknesses in foreign policy and military strategy, operational and tactical commanders have the requisite guidance to conduct peace-enforcement missions. In the last decade, military forces have been successful in nearly every crisis action, Beirut being the notable exception. General Powell asserts that this is due to judicious tailoring of forces to accomplish specific political objectives.⁹³ Several of the operations, particularly Panama, northern Iraq, and now Somalia, bear characteristics of a peace-enforcement mission including combat intervention to restore order, humanitarian assistance, and diplomatic

negotiation. Given a clear strategic mission and the resources to do it, operational commanders have been able to accomplish specific national strategic objectives.

Due to the potential combat nature of peace-enforcement operations, tactical leaders and units would operate essentially as they were trained for larger combat operations. Operations in northern Iraq, Yugoslavia and Somalia support this. Barring significant changes in the nature of potential threats to US forces, current operational strategy and tactics are more than adequate for the execution of peace-enforcement missions.

X: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Problems created by an ambiguous national strategy will not be readily corrected. Not only is the international environment confusing but the US may be undergoing a significant shift towards domestic priorities at the expense of foreign affairs. Currently, one of the largest domestic constraints is the need to reduce the US deficit by spending less. Reduced military spending has a far reaching impact on which national interests can be furthered through the use of military force. The new administration must build a firm bipartisan consensus on US foreign policy,

then thoroughly articulate the vision and strategy before the ambiguity can be eliminated.⁹⁴

Military training must focus on better execution of contingency operations at the lower end of conventional operations. This is especially important when so-called non-traditional US interests, such as promotion of stability and democracy, are at stake.⁹⁵ Emphasis should be placed on potential emerging missions including peace-enforcement. Command and control exercises should include portions of the NCA decision making process to establish political objectives. Operational commanders must think through difficult problems such as coalition command structures and conflict termination mechanisms which have a significant impact on peace-enforcement missions. Multiple civilian agencies, including the State Department and non-governmental organizations, should be involved in the exercise because they will play a crucial role in any successful peace-enforcement operation. By examining non-traditional roles and missions in this manner, military leaders can ensure military strategy and doctrine keep pace with evolving national strategy. At the same time, they can evaluate force structure, training, and doctrine to ensure they meet future challenges as well.

Lastly, peace-enforcement should be formally accepted as a doctrinal term and mission. Not only is

it the best term to describe operations such as those now unfolding in Somalia, but the mission will likely be repeated in future crises. The use and acceptance of a more descriptive mission profile can assist future force planners and commanders. This will assist in any "adjustment of attitude" that might be necessary for peace-enforcers to maintain the strategic-operational links necessary to reach the desired end state.

Peace-enforcement is a new mission that is supported at each level of war, from the tactical to the national-strategic. In turn, it is a useful concept for strategists and operational planners as well as a definable task at the tactical level. Peace-enforcement may be only one of several new missions to emerge as US policy makers articulate a new national strategy. Senior military leaders must remain attuned to the changing security environment and evolving strategy. New missions may need to be developed, or old ones modified, to support a new national strategy. Each potential new mission must be thoroughly examined to determine if it is supported at each level of war and if it contributes to the military's ability to attain national strategic objectives. Only in this way, can the military avoid repeating mistakes that led to tragic consequences in Korea in the summer of 1950, when military strategy and capabilities were not in step with foreign policy.

APPENDIX A

DEFINITIONS

The following definitions are necessary for this study.⁹⁶

Campaigns are a series of related joint major operations designed to achieve one or more strategic objectives within an [area of responsibility]. Wartime campaigns are broad in scope and usually involve the employment of large forces. There can also be peacetime campaigns. These can be broad in scope but do not usually involve the employment of large forces. In either case, the campaign plan describes this series of operations and is a written expression of operational art.⁹⁷

Humanitarian Conflict is a term developed by USPACOM to describe humanitarian efforts in which conflict is involved or the potential for conflict is great. This term recognizes that the operation involves much more than a humanitarian relief operation. The potential for conflict is great and the operation must be planned accordingly.⁹⁸

Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) is a political-military confrontation between contending states or groups below conventional war and above the routine, peaceful competition among states. Low intensity

conflicts are often localized, generally in the Third World, but contain regional and global security implications.⁹⁹

National Objectives are the aims, derived from national goals and interests, towards which a national policy or strategy is directed and efforts and resources of the nation are applied.¹⁰⁰

Peacekeeping operations are conducted with the consent of the belligerent parties, designed to maintain a negotiated truce and help promote conditions that support the diplomatic efforts to establish a long-term peace in the areas of conflict. (May also be called trucekeeping.)


Peacemaking is a process of arranging an end to disputes and resolving issues that led to conflict, primarily through diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other forms of peaceful settlement.

Peace-building is post-conflict diplomatic and military actions that seek to rebuild the institutions and infrastructures of a nation torn by civil war; or build bonds of peaceful mutual benefit among nations formerly at war, in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.

Peace-enforcement is a military operation in support of diplomatic efforts to restore peace between belligerents who may not be consenting to intervention, and may be engaged in combat activities.

Preventive Diplomacy is diplomatic action in advance of predictable crises aimed at resolving sources of conflict before violence erupts, and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur.

OPERATIONAL CONTINUUM



CRISIS BEGINS

CRISIS ENDS

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